Driving the “Vibe Shift”: Harnessing Narratives on Family, Care, and Gender
Photo by Hennie Stander on Unsplash
In a 2024 podcast interview with Joe Rogan, Mark Zuckerberg mentioned that corporate culture in America is neutered, taking the grandstand view that the workplace needs more “masculine energy.” At the time, in some circles, Zuckerberg’s comments were the source of both outrage and mockery (I will admit I much laughed). But since then, a more intellectualized version of that idea—one that has always lingered in the background—has started to gain ground in North American and European cultural discourse. What once lived in conservative or fringe think tanks and conferences has seeped into the mainstream and even pop culture. Most recently, Helen Andrews made the case in a New York Times podcast and op-ed with Ross Douthat, claiming that companies and institutions now have “too many women,” a shift she says threatens civilizational decline.
Views expressed in podcasts or social media in the vein of Zuckerberg’s comments are not simply ideological statements in the realm of gender and work. These cultural moments mirror a wider trend of authoritarian populist leaders and supportive movements pursuing a dual strategy: attempting to claim ownership over narratives on masculinity, femininity, motherhood, care, domesticity, and health as a way to reach broader publics, and cultivating an intellectual and cultural mood (a vibe shift, if you will) that normalizes hierarchy and turns back the clock on recent progress toward pluralist, inclusive democracies. Notably, they also advance essentialist views on sex and gender with far-ranging effects. By sex and gender essentialism I refer to the beliefs that men and women have fixed, natural, biologically-determined traits that determine how they should behave and what roles they should have in society, and that government, and public and workplace policy, should be grounded in that idea. Across social media, many micro-trends increasingly draw on and reinforce these beliefs.
Efforts to redeem and re-normalize ideas about fixed gender roles and opposition to pluralism and equality are pushed in speeches and essays, but also through policy. Across Europe, authoritarian populist leaders are putting forward social and family policies that blur the usual left–right lines, positioning themselves as the ones who care about families, women, and “the people.” By advancing certain kinds of welfare measures, they strengthen their people-versus-elites message and expand their support at a time when many are frustrated with mainstream politics.
I am terrified at the prospect that extremist and authoritarian movements might succeed in positioning themselves as the voices of care, redistributive family policy, or motherhood.
Electorally, at least across several countries, we observe a widening chasm amongst younger generations in how women and men vote, the latter increasingly supporting authoritarian leaders. But this trend will not necessarily consolidate—it’s an open struggle.
Much is still changing, and while I am scared, I also think we have the potential to get ahead of the curve and recognize that care, family, work, and motherhood (and related policies), are ideas and notions that those committed to pluralism, democracy, and justice, should be leading on—shaping and claiming as part of a more inclusive vision. That being said, ideas about care and family may be the next cultural and political battleground in ways that perhaps we still don’t anticipate. Attacks on DEI were preceded by intellectuals promoting the Great Replacement Theory and the catch-all slur, “cultural marxism.” Attacks on abortion rights and trans rights have been shaped by decades of boosting a moral panic around “gender ideology.” Developing a full picture of the role ideas and policy play in the realm of family, gender, and care in authoritarian populist politics is therefore crucial.
All Roads Lead to Essentialism: The Great Feminization and the Fragmentation of our Algorithmic Reality
Helen Andrews came onto my radar this past September. An American conservative political commentator and author, she delivered a speech at the U.S. National Conservatism conference that quickly became one of the most-watched speeches in the event’s history. She followed the speech with “The Great Feminization” essay and a recent interview on Ross Douthat’s podcast at the New York Times.
In her writing and public speaking, Andrews argues that women entering the workforce at high levels over the past few decades (the feminization) has brought about horrible results. In essence, Andrews argues, men and women have different virtues and vices intrinsic to their sexes. Women prioritize “empathy over rationality, safety over risk, cohesion over competition.” This is problematic because “female modes of interaction [conflict avoidance, empathy, safety, and cohesion] are not well suited to accomplishing the goals of many major institutions.” These are old ideas, still consciously or unconsciously held by many people, yet Andrews is repurposing and stating them openly, cultivating her image as counter-cultural.
According to Andrews, women are too emotional and have created a hostile environment for men who are not allowed to let their virtues shine for fear of retaliation. She often uses Larry Summers’ case from 2006 as an example of women overreacting and forcing his resignation as Harvard president. Unfortunately for her argument, just last week, newly released documents in the Epstein files revealed that “Summers corresponded with Epstein until the day before the financier's 2019 arrest for the alleged sex trafficking of minors.” That is, the two were in touch for over a decade after Epstein had already been sent to jail for soliciting a minor for prostitution.
What’s more, Andrews had an epiphany when she realized that “the great feminization” and wokeness, evidently the source of all evil, are intimately related. According to her, “everything you think of as wokeness involves prioritizing the feminine over the masculine.” It is necessary to reverse this, especially when, in her view, the “feminization” is not “an organic result of women outcompeting men. It is an artificial result of social engineering, and if we take our thumb off the scale it will collapse within a generation.” Her solution: do away with anti-discrimination law, and the feminization of the workplace and institutions will unravel.
That Andrews and thinkers like her are garnering views and attention is significant; their views capture the core tenets of authoritarian populist politics: essentialism, anti-pluralism, and the belief in natural social hierarchies. Andrews’ approach is a heavily “intellectual” one, one shared in think tanks, journals, and mainstream podcasts. What she cultivates in those spaces, others develop in other venues, whether in orthodox religious communities or more novel identity formations and social media trends like tradwives, incels, chads, passport bros, or MAHA. Their views may still not be majoritarian (at least not as explicitly), but Andrews is not alone in reinforcing the ideas that men and women are fundamentally distinct and have different roles to play in society that laws and policy ought to reinforce (in our (En)Gendering Authoritarianism report, we unpacked the idea of gender complementarity). As Sarah Longwell of the Focus Group podcast notes, voters are becoming increasingly more likely to openly admit that they would not want a woman as president (listen to this podcast: MAGA Has Repulsed Young Women).
The fractured nature of our media consumption and algorithmically shaped reality means that there are myriad paths available into this hierarchical and unequal worldview. It’s as if all of these spaces and trends mentioned above are different sides of a hexagon—one that has hierarchy and essentialism at its core, each side offering a different entry point into its center. This worldview can also be reinforced via policy.
Prioritizing “Familialist” Social Policies as a Cornerstone of Far-Right Programs
Family, relationships, and being able to provide care to beloveds are central in people’s lives. They are a source of joy, but also stress in times of hardship, particularly considering economic models that are not built to support care or prioritize relationships and well-being. That far-right parties advance welfare and social policies that benefit families in their supportive role may seem contradictory to some. Yet advancing such policies is a way to muster mass public support and nurture one’s image as a populist who addresses genuine problems. In the report Learning from Authoritarians, the authors remark that the appeal of authoritarian populist leaders in countries as disparate as India, El Salvador, Poland, and Hungary in large part stems from the implementation of welfare policies, which serve both to signal commitment but also to deliver at least some results (a dynamic that seems different in the U.S., where right-wing economic populist discourse seems to be always only rhetorical).
Across continental Europe, be it Fidesz in Hungary, Vox in Spain, AfD in Germany, or Law and Justice in Poland, these parties are speaking of care, acknowledging women’s disproportionate burden in the realm of taking care of children and elders, and proposing, and at times implementing, public policies that respond to this reality. Concerningly, they are doing so far more than other parties. Research has found that across Europe, radical right parties debate the “concept of family in distributive terms to a greater extent than other parties.”
The most prominent example of a social policy implemented by a far-right party is the Family 500+ policy in Poland, which provided a monthly benefit of 500 Polish zloty (roughly $135 or €118) for every child with the goal of increasing overall birth rates. This policy would traditionally be unlikely for a conservative party, and while it failed to fully achieve its natalist goals, it did lead to a drop in child poverty.
Yet authoritarian populist parties support families in their caring function in very particular ways. These parties advance passive measures, such as family allowances, child benefits, cash-for-care, and tax rebates (known as “familialist” policies.) They generally steer clear of what is known as “de-familialist” policies, that is, facilitating care that takes place outside of the home (childcare, public services)—which would allow for both parents to pursue a career, and thus reinforce gender inequality and women staying at home. In fact, evidence on the Family 500+ benefit suggests that the program led to the labor force participation rate of mothers to drop. In Hungary, Orbán also introduced tax credits for families having children, while at the same time dismantling the social welfare system by phasing out needs-based principles and not addressing severe shortcomings in public services that could truly help families.
Some of these family policies are not bad per se, especially when they achieve laudable goals, such as reducing child poverty. Thus, the public responds to them, even though it must be noted that the policies are always partial and often symbolic. The way in which they are designed is specifically tied to nativist goals: they bake in essentialist gender role ideas in the programs, promote the male breadwinner model, and move us even further away from the possibility of gender equality—all while leaving behind LGBTQ+ people and gender non-conforming individuals.
The Road Ahead
Anti-feminism, fighting so-called gender ideology, and placing social hierarchy and biological essentialism at the center of authoritarian populist discourse is not incidental and not only reactionary—it is a “constitutive element of political movements” that seek to justify inequality and enforce conformity with rigid gender and racial norms.
If authoritarian populist political and cultural leaders succeed at owning the narratives on family, femininity, masculinity, care, domesticity, health, and social policy–which they are attempting to do through building an intellectual infrastructure, nourishing myriad micro-trends, and reaching out to people in non-political communities–they will manage to appeal to even greater swathes of the public. This is because these are some of the most intimate aspects of people’s identities and lives and often the most connected to emotions in general and love in particular. As Hannah Arendt wrote, “much more important for mass appeal is a general mood than laid down outlines and platforms.”
These movements spread their own agenda and falsehoods, always enlisting an element of truth, and in doing so, attempt to create a moral high ground. Pro-democracy and pro-human rights movements need to be aware of the mechanics of how this is operating, have their own narratives, and be incredibly careful not to reproduce authoritarians’ claims or fall into their traps.
If the social media movements mentioned above resonate, if far-right politicians in Eastern Europe can succeed by advancing certain social policies that run counter to conservative economic orthodoxy, it’s because they touch a raw nerve, or connect to underlying realities—there’s always a kernel of truth. MAHA makes sense when you consider the medical system’s failure to address chronic disease; tradwives respond to women’s exhaustion and having to excel both at work and in the home; and so on.
Lately, I often see progressive activists, centrist pundits, and cultural influencers state that “the left,” “progressives,” “liberals,” “social democrats,” and so on do not have narratives nor create space for those who want a family, children, etc. I do not believe this to be true. In fact, I believe that this is an example of taking a characterization that the far-right promotes as a true reflection of reality and uncritically reproducing it, thus strengthening it. (Not incidentally, there are many such examples.) However, it is true that more expansive views of family and relationships, non-traditional family models, and so on, can at times be more complex or less intuitive to understand. That’s something we need to grapple with, while facing the challenge that in pluralist societies, there will have to be space for people holding different views–at the same time that no one’s rights, humanity, or belonging are compromisable.
If Zuckerberg, Andrews, and the social media landscape foreshadow what’s to come, the road ahead will be challenging and turbulent. However, we can still chart a path that is neither reactive nor imitative—one grounded in our own values, narratives, and commitments—and prepare ourselves strategically rather than be caught reacting to others’ terms.
And for the soul…
Rosalía’s new album, Lux, is a feast for the heart and the soul–I also think it embodies belonging and care. She mixes styles and sings in more than 13 languages, including Catalan, English, Spanish, Arabic, German, and Latin. I love Reliquia; La Perla (dedicated to her ex) is hilarious and poetic; la Yugular, in Catalan and English, touched my heart.
Another release that’s beautiful and tender: Patti Smith’s new memoir Bread of Angels. A good time to listen alongside her iconic album Horses, which just celebrated its 50th anniversary.
Related to the essay’s topic: motherhood can appear in fashion campaigns in creative and progressive ways. See Paloma Wool’s AW 2025, received with much acclaim. In the designer’s words: “The images in this campaign mirror my daily life over the last months. With Candela’s birth and Salomé growing quickly, the boundaries between home and work have blurred. Depicting this duality, the encounters and the tensions between these two spheres, felt like the most honest way to portray paloma wool right now.”
Connecting the Dots: Musings on Bridging and Belonging is a monthly column by Míriam Juan-Torres. In it, Míriam reflects on current events, connecting the trends and considering the specificities across countries, applying a bridging and belonging lens and translating concepts from academia for a wider audience. Join our mailing list to stay up to date on the latest of the Democracy & Belonging Forum's curated analysis from Miriam and more.
Editor's note: The ideas expressed in this blog are not necessarily those of the Othering & Belonging Institute or UC Berkeley, but belong to the authors.